This has been a big month for international diplomacy. The Greek bailout and the Iranian nuclear deal were front page news and everyone has an opinion, especially Donald Trump and Ted Cruz. Yet international negotiations are rarely simple, and it is deceptively easy to look through the mass media's refracting prism and believe we know what actually went on. And of course we could have gotten a better deal than those soft-headed canape-munching suits sitting around conference tables, right? Conversely, our hearts melt for those we perceive as the victims of the machinations of elite technocrats, the bankers and politicians and economists and nuclear scientists who hold sway in heartless wicked places like Brussels, Berlin and Vienna, far-removed from the tribulations of ordinary people in Thessaloniki, Tel Aviv and Texas.
I really couldn't say whether Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is a tragic hero felled by cruel Fate (as enacted by Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schauble), or whether Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif is a smooth-talking Bond villain who has pulled a fast one over naive John Kerry and feckless Barack Obama. As a nobody living halfway across the world, my opinion doesn't much matter. However, as someone who has spent half a life studying and practicing international relations, I did find myself fascinated with the two diplomatic matches played this week. I grumbled "Really?" or nodded in appreciation ("Well played, sir!") at various enthralling moments and, just as any engaged spectator should, I made mental notes for future reference. Here are some lessons I took away in contrasting the Greek and Iranian strategies for negotiation:
Have a realistic goal.
What did the Greeks really want? Former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis insists the Syriza government's goal all along was a moderate package of debt restructuring and that his European interlocutors just didn't listen. Really? Or was it that Syriza believed they could foment an anti-austerity revolution that would coerce Germany and the rest of Europe into paying for Greek pensions and other entitlements into the indefinite future? From Varoufakis' pronouncements as an "erratic Marxist" (http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/06/our-no-is-a-majestic-big-yes-to-a-democratic-rational-europe/#more-8425), you get the sense Syriza thought Greece could be the vanguard of a Leninist revolution that would transform Europe in a jiffy, probably not a realistic ambition for the plodding and rather creaky consensus-based intergovernmental structures of the European Union as it has evolved and expanded over the last half-century.
The Iranians, on the other hand, knew exactly what they wanted - in the short-term, reprieve from the sanctions that have crippled their economy and increased internal dissent, and in the longer-term, resumption of their goal for regional hegemony. Iran's Western interlocutors were equally focused on removing Iran's potential for nuclear weapons in the short to medium term, and establishing avenues for careful dialogue and engagement in the longer term. Each side knew what the other was after and had prepared the ground for dialogue. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/10/secret-side-iran-us-relations-since-1979-revolution) They were ready to play the game because they knew what they wanted to win.
Play the game.
Wear the suit (even if you won't wear a tie. After all, Iranians don't.) Stick to message - i.e. if you're going to plead poverty, don't pose for photo-shoots eating lobster and cavorting on a penthouse balcony with your glamorous heiress wife. (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/15/greek-minister-yanis-varoufakis-i-regret-paris-match-photo-shoot) Do go to meetings and actually listen to the other side drone on. Take notes and acknowledge their needs and where they are coming from. (Probably better though not to let the paparazzi photograph your notes reminding yourself "No triumphalism". (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-07/everyone-is-trying-to-decode-this-photo-of-the-greek-s-finance-minister-s-handwritten-notes)) Make it clear what you want, where you can't budge (and why not), and be creative in finding spaces for compromise. In other words, negotiate, don't just play at it.
Don't demonize people from whom you want something.
Did the Greeks really think that publicly calling the Germans Nazis and the International Monetary Fund criminals was going to increase their chances of getting Germany or the IMF to give them more money? In contrast, the Iranians seem to have gone out of their way to be respectful to the United States, a move reciprocated by the Obama Administration. Both sides had to backtrack on years of shrill name-calling ("Axis of Evil", anyone?); and therein lies a lesson for today's radical student leader: tomorrow (or thirty years from now) you might have to negotiate with "the Great Satan" who might not have taken the insult too kindly.
Recognize your limits. And don't (try to) back your opponents into a corner.
Megalomania is a Greek word. And it was amply demonstrated over the last few weeks by the Greek government as it careened from negotiating session to referendum and back into negotiation armed, it thought, with a resounding democratic mandate ("Oxi!") - a proud "No!" to what exactly? Amazingly, Tsipras and his colleagues seem to have thought that 61% of Greeks saying no to an inchoate draft document outlining proposed conditions for fresh borrowing would intimidate the rest of Europe into meekly conceding and handing over the keys to the European Central Bank's printing press. Meanwhile, the leaders of the other 18 democracies in the eurozone considered whether their electorates and parliamentary colleagues would go along with any kind of preferential treatment for Greece, and Angela Merkel, the one European politician you really shouldn't cross or underestimate, (http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/quiet-german) quietly consulted, consolidated alliances and politely waited as Greek banks ran out of money and Tsipras was driven back to the table to sign a deal appreciably more rigorous than the one he had walked away from days previously. In contrast, the United States and its allies in the multilateral negotiation with Iran used the prospect of lifting sanctions in a measured way to entice Iran into dismantling portions of its nuclear program and accepting international inspections.
Keep your enemies close and your friends even closer.
A key tenet of German foreign policy since 1963 has been to walk in lockstep (at least publicly) with France on all major European matters. Post-war German leaders have been acutely aware of the potential backlash if Germany were seen to be pushing its weight as the dominant power in Europe. Cooperation with France (and deeper integration within Europe, more generally) provides cover for the assertion of German interests. This essential principle was closely tested during the recent Greek crisis and there was significant media commentary on the divergence between the German willingness to allow Greece to leave the eurozone and France's insistence at keeping Greece in, even if that meant a hard to implement agreement that was forced upon a reluctant Greek government. While media commentators have been hard on Merkel, I remain impressed by her capacity to thread the needle between, on the one hand, the imperative to maintain public unity with French Socialist President Hollande (who had his own political and economic imperatives for getting a deal) and, on the other hand, her own far more fiscally conservative Finance Minister, Christian Democrat party and a country that abhors debt and is tired of endlessly financing the rest of Europe. (Incidentally, how master-politician Merkel manages and uses Schauble as foil in their good cop/bad cop routine is a revealing contrast to Tsipras's incapacity to contain Varoufakis, both when he was alienating the other Finance Ministers in eurogroup meetings ("I wear the creditors' loathing with pride"), and when he subsequently resigned and voted No to the deal in the Greek parliament.) To be fair, Tsipras seems to have done as good a job as possible in holding his fractious party together in the circumstances, but I wonder why he wouldn't have figured out that the more uncompromising members of his party would vote no, especially after the referendum result had given them a mandate for hardening their position.
By way of contrast, both the United States and Iran did an excellent job in the traditional forte of international diplomacy - building interwoven alliances operating on multiple dimensions of shared interest to encircle an opponent and bringing them to an agreement. The stature of the negotiating parties (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) gave international legitimacy and cover all around. Iran was able to call on Russia and China in support of its sovereignty arguments. The United States used its traditional allies (the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as well as the European Union) to buttress non-proliferation objectives. President Obama has carefully alluded to a collateral benefit achieved by engaging Russia in the Iran talks at a time when US-Russia relations are strained over Ukraine. And, perhaps most importantly (although Obama will never get credit for his far-sighted China policy), the United States continues to engage China as a strategic partner, turning what could have been another Cold War type rivalry between superpowers into a much more complex engagement of interdependence and shared interest in managing the global system.
A deal is just a deal.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has mastered the Churchillian glower, the overblown rhetoric and the invective of racism. All that's missing is the cigar. Israel's reflexive allies in the United States seem stuck in the 1930s, accusing Obama of appeasement and of declaring war on Israel by signing a deal with its enemies. In an age of total war and over-the-top political rhetoric, it is especially important to realize that not all agreements are appeasement. As Obama pointed out ironically, you don't sign this kind of agreement with your friends. Diplomacy is not about giving away your fundamental interests. It is about accepting the provisional, recognizing the other parties' autonomy while seeking to constrain it by identifying shared interests and offering incentives for good behaviour, creating the space and conditions for the kind of future scenarios you prefer. It is important to get the timing right. It is vital to verify that your opponent has carried out agreed upon commitments. It is crucial to be realistic. If Angela Merkel and Barack Obama get their way, the deals they have reached will not bring Greeks the same standard of living as Germans or provide Israelis and Americans perfect security against all threats from Iran or its allied non-state actors. But they will be the best deals possible under constrained circumstances. And sometimes that is good enough.
